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Israel Scheffler's Conditions of Knowledge has been 
reissued in 1978 by the University of Chicago Press, 
after having been first published in 1965. Scheffler 
begins the book with a brief introduction giving his 
purpose, to examine epistemplogical theory with an eye 
to its relevance to educators. He gives a short summary 
of three epistemological theories and their implications 
for a theory of education, albeit a simplified account. 
The "rationalistic" epistemology is represented by Plato's 
Meno; the "empiricistic," by Locke's theory of the 
tabula rasa and the importance of experience; and the 
"pragmatic" view, by Dewey's "trying and undergoing." 
A brief account of questions about knowledge which would 
interest educators follows his summary. Of these 
questions, the book deals with only one, what is knowl-
edge? Thus Scheffler is ommitting evaluative (what 
sort of knowledge is best?), genetic (how does knowledge 
arise?), methodological (how ought the search for knowl-
edge be conducted?) and pedagogical (how is knowledge 
best taught?) questions about epistemology and deals 
only with epistemology in the general sense. He takes 
this approach apparently for reasons of length and 
because the book is, after all, an introductory one. 
However, that these omitted epistemological questions a r e 
crucial to the educator is fairly clear. 
Before launching into the main topic of the book, 
what is knowledge?, Scheffler introduces some distinc-
tions derived from common uses of the verb "know" in 
his first chapter, "Knowledge and Teaching." 
Scheffler wishes to point out that there are different 
senses of "knowing" that have implications for teaching 
as well. He addresses the usual distinction between a 
weak sense of "knowing that" and a strong sense of 
"knowing that" in propositional knowledge. The weak 
sense depends on having true belief; the strong sense 
depends on being able to supply some reason for the 
belief, backing of some sort. "Any teaching is geared 
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to what the teacher takes to be true, and his aim is not 
merely that his student learn what he takes to be true 
but that he be able to support it by criteria of proper 
backing taken to be authoritative" (12-13). This point-
could be expanded into an "ethics of teaching" as James 
McClellan stresses in Philosophy of Education.1 Teachers 
must feel morally bound to teach the truth, since 
learners are vulnerable to the teaching of various sorts 
of untruth, especially younger learners. This point 
Scheffler addresses only briefly, as it is outside the 
scope of his book. The point could be further expanded 
in that advanced students, or any students who wish to 
be creative thinkers, must be able to identify proper 
criteria for their "beliefs" (hypotheses) before any 
discoveries will add to the body, of knowledge. This 
strong sense of "knowing that," which Scheffler calls 
"propositional knowledge" forms the basis of the bulk 
of the book. Scheffler also includes a chapter on 
procedural knowledge or skill, that is, knowledge in 
the sense of "know how" as opposed to "know that." 
The second chapter, "Knowledge and Truth," deals 
essentially with the modern problem of the fallibility 
of knowledge that, according to Scheffler, is our 
inheritance from the scepticism of Hume. Scheffler's 
exposition of the problem is clear and relevant to 
modern approaches to education. He feels that the prag-
matic view of truth helps us to solve the problem that 
Hume's epistemology sets, without committing educators 
to either horn of the epistemological dilemma: that . 
there is an absolute "Truth" waiting to be discovered, 
or that all truth is relative and' limited, to the per-
ceptions of the moment. Scheffler discards what he 
calls the phenomenalist solution of the problem of 
fallibilism—that one is always sure at least of what 
one feels at the present moment. This provides only a 
"weak and transient kind of certainty" (p. 39), although 
it does clarify one sense of "knowing that" which does 
not require evidence. One knows that one is in pain 
without having to be able to prove it. According to 
Scheffler, it is a simple catagory mistake to say that 
since we cannot be sure, then there must be no absolute 
truth. "There seems, however, to be a fundamental con-
fusion here between absolute truth and certainty. It is 
one thing to believe that truth is an absolute, i.e., 
unvarying property of ideas or beliefs: It is quite 
another to suppose we can ever be certain that we have 
the truth" (p. 47). For instance, according to 
Scheffler's account, Charles Sanders Peirce believes 
reality exists independently of our (possibly) fallible 
perceptions of it and will eventually be discovered if 
only we carry on responsible inquiry long enough. 
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Scheffler's point is that there are different kinds of 
propositional knowledge, with different proper criteria 
of truth. Although we.may very well be mistaken in any 
given matter, we still must, and can, keep in mind that 
"our job is not to judge the truth infallibly but to 
estimate the truth responsibly" (p. 54). John Stuart 
Mill would have fit in well here, as giving an example 
of an epistemological theory of how we arrive at social 
and political truths, truths which appear to be much 
shadier areas of certainty than natural science or 
mathematics. Scheffler might have steered educators to 
On Liberty as a classic pluralistic theory which avoids 
the extreme relativism of which our age seems so fond 
while foreshadowing some elements of pragmatic episte-
mology. And it would have been helpful to see a more 
comprehensive coverage of Dewey's theory of doing and 
undergoing as a test of truth, especially considering 
Scheffler's many references to other pragmatic notions 
having to do with knowledge: belief and evidence. 
Scheffler's chapter on the evidence condition of 
knowledge begins with the simple points that evidence 
must be (1) adequate, i.e., all relevant evidence must 
have been considered; (2) appropriate to the subject 
matter at hand (evidence for mathematics differs from 
evidence for morals and both differ from evidence for 
empirical matters: these are the three divisions that 
Scheffler offers); and (3) appropriate to the age level 
of the person making the judgments. Standards for 
evidence are culturally and historically relative as 
well. Finally, some matters are not subject to the 
evidence condition, as is shown in the above example 
about knowing when you are in pain. Outlining all 
these qualifications about the limits of evidence, 
Scheffler introduces J. L. Austin's analysis of the 
statement "I know" as a person's way of indicating that 
he is in a position of authority. Scheffler wishes to 
add to this analysis, because, as he points out, we can 
(and often do) investigate a person's right to make that 
claim. "Furthermore, even when he has said 'I know,' 
effectively asserting his authority to the claim in 
question and accepting full responsibility for it, we 
may still ask whether he does indeed have the authority 
he asserts" (p. 63). Scheffler brings in A. J. Ayer, 
who calls this our "right to be sure." In addition, 
Scheffler points out that it is often the case that a 
student can understand an authoritative argument or proof 
without having been able to make it up himself. This 
case also softens the evidence condition, since we 
commonly consider this adequate ground for a knowledge 
claim. 
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In Chapter Four Scheffler analyzes the belief con-
dition of knowledge. One can believe something without 
knowing it, but whatever one knows one must also believe. 
But what is belief? Scheffler discusses the verbal 
behavior theory of belief following Rudolf Carnap, R. M. 
Hare, and, curiously enough, B. F. Skinner, in their 
accounts of belief as a verbal disposition to act, 
namely to say "I believe" in response to a question or 
a situation. But Scheffler adds that belief is not 
simply the tendency to affirm something, because it is 
possible to believe without affirming. If we supplement 
the verbal theory by saying that belief is indicated 
when the subject makes a decision to respond affirmative-
ly and truthfully, Scheffler feels that some obvious 
objections to the verbal theory may be overcome, yet the 
verbal theory may have become circular. An alternative 
account is the dispositional account of belief, follow-
ing Peirce who construes belief as dispositional: 
"belief . . . puts us into such a condition that we 
shall behave in a certain way" (p. 83). This theory 
would cover a broader array of responses due to belief, 
yet, as Scheffler points out, all beliefs are not 
always subject to the motivation of an occasion to 
respond. Here he introduces Hempel's analysis to 
account for the "quasi-theoretical assumptions" that 
people hold which in turn influence their actions. 
Scheffler concludes that a concept of belief must be 
broader than a disposition to act in certain ways, 
verbal or otherwise. "Belief is rather a 'theoretical' 
state characterizing, in subtle ways, the orientation 
of the person in the world" (p. 90). 
The main thrust of the final chapter, "Knowledge 
and Skill," is that there are two kinds of "know-how." 
One is routine and does not imply the "intellectualist 
legend" that "knowing how" requires "knowing that." The 
other concerns "critical skills" involving thinking. 
Scheffler urges the need for educators to be aware that 
both sorts of know-how may require practice, but the 
kind of practice will differ if it is to result in skill 
in intelligent activities which is, after all, a very 
important part of what educators are after in the long 
run. 
In general, this book is useful and clear, but 
suffers somewhat from the typical drawbacks of any 
introductory book attempting to cover a highly technical 
and wide-ranging topic, epistemology, from the point of 
view of the disciplines of education and philosophy. 
Educators may find that the philosophical arguments are 
too abbreviated and philosophers may think that the 
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educational view is too narrow to be philosophically 
adequate. Neither view is entirely true. Students of 
educational philosophy who are interested in a continua-
tion of some of Scheffler's views and in the applica-
tions of modern philosophical analysis to the philosophy 
of education could, after reading Scheffler's book, turn 
to James McClellan's book, Philosophy of Education. This 
would enable the reader to continue further study in this 
area. 
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